Impact of the British Attritional Strategy at Sea on the German Collapse

Table of Contents

 

Section A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources                                                              2

Section B: Investigation                                                                                                         4

Section C: Reflection                                                                                                             9

Works Cited                                                                                                                          11

 

 

Section A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources

 

 This investigation will explore the question: In what ways, and with what effects did British attritional strategy at sea (1914-1918) influence the German collapse throughout World War I?

 The first source which will be evaluated is A History Of The Royal Navy: World War I, a secondary source written by Mike Farquharson-Roberts and published in 2014. Farquharson-Roberts has a PhD in Maritime History, and is an Associate Research Fellow of the National Museum of the Royal Navy. This book is relevant to my research because it portrays how neutral flags participated in the blockade of Germany, and the corresponding effect of constriction of resources vital to German front-line operations.

 In relation to origin, this source is valuable because it was published in 2014, giving the author the benefit of hindsight and access to additional research. Although Farquharson-Roberts majors in Maritime History, the origin is limiting because he lacks equivalent expertise in the land-based history that he links to the effects of naval attrition.

The purpose of this source is to demonstrate the relevance of intervention of neutral powers in restricting Germany’s economic resources from the perspective of the British navy. A limitation of the purpose is that it shows the effect of the blockade on Germany’s resources solely from the perspective of the British Navy, limiting the historian’s comprehension of various perspectives.

A value of this book in relation to content is its portrayal that Britain’s control of German resources was key to Germany’s defeat. A limitation of the content is that it disregards the German perspective of the effects of the blockade.

 The second source to be evaluated is a secondary account written by Robert Asprey and published in 1991, called The German High Command At War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I. Asprey was an American military historian, who also published a book on 20th century guerrilla warfare. This book is relevant to my investigation because it identifies the causes of failure in the spring offensives, portraying the lack of materials due to the blockade to be critical.

 A value of the source in relation to origin is that Asprey was an American military historian, which provides credibility to the source. A limitation of the origin is found in Asprey’s introduction: “It is not easy to find the answers. German World War I archives were destroyed along with most of Potsdam by Allied bombers late in the war,” (11) showing Asprey had access to limited primary sources, which proved his research to be difficult and more unreliable than if these were still in existence.

 The purpose of this source is to show the contrast in both resource quantity and troop morale between the Allied and German forces during the spring offensives. In addition, it aims to identify how this contrast led to the failure of the Ludendorff Offensive, which was the decisive indicator of the German collapse. A value of the purpose is that it provides a German perspective of the offensives, which perhaps is more credible than a British perspective, as the Germans could directly witness the effects that material deficiency had on their ranks.

 In relation to content, a value of the source is that Asprey depicts the accumulating effects of the blockade during the offensive in a progressive manner, and discusses how starvation decreased German troops’ morale so significantly that they conformed to the anti-militaristic ideals of a ceasefire. A limitation of the content is that it fails to discuss the effects of the blockade on the military previous to the offensive, leaving the historian to provide prerequisite information.

Section B: Investigation

Although naval tactics and strategies are often disregarded as a decisive factor in the defeat of Germany in the First World War (1914-1918), the attritional nature of the British economic blockade in the case of total war played an indispensable role in the failure of the German collapse throughout World War I. Hopes of a glorious German victory became evanescent throughout the war due to repercussions of the blockade, although German military commanders refused to acknowledge this until the Allied counter-offensive of 1918. The naval blockade enforced by the British at the initiation of war caused German war efforts to deteriorate through constricting neutral trade, diminishing troop numbers and morale, and causing extension of supply lines and deteriorated perseverance during the final offensives.

 Perhaps the most critical factor contributing to the outcome of the German collapse was Britain’s successful naval constriction exercised over neutral flags to eliminate trade with Germany. Concentration of merchant fleets that Britain controlled compared to all other powers combined was superior, enabling her to dictate the destination of cargo (Farquharson-Roberts 166). In addition, the Paris Declaration of 1856 enforced a policy allowing belligerent powers to interdict neutral ships and seize contraband of war destined for the enemy (Farquharson-Roberts 165). This allowed Britain to restrict German munitions, resulting in a shortage of armaments at the front line. In 1916, Britain made the pivotal decision to expand the list of absolute contraband; they added conditional contraband such as foodstuffs, coal, cotton, rubber, metallic ores, and fertilizers. (Philpott 198). These items were now unable to reach Germany’s industrial facilities, preventing necessary resources from being made for military use. This contributed to considerable deficiencies in munitions and the health of soldiers during the war.

 The confiscation of neutral and German merchant ships was essential to blockade of resources. It caused a lack of essential food and munitions for Germany, contrasting increased resources for Britain, who utilized the seizures themselves. This contrast in supply quantities was decisive in the case of attritional warfare. There existed three routes through which Germany could trade: the Baltic, the English Channel, and the North Sea. Russia, Britain’s ally, shared Baltic coastline with Germany, ensuring the blockade of German resources. The English Channel was small, effectively closing off trade, leaving the Royal Fleet to concentrate forces on the North Sea (Farquharson-Roberts 170). British Naval Commander John Jellicoe revealed that “the alternative of controlling the Dover and Norway-Scotland exits… had been adopted” (Jellicoe 170). Sweden, a neutral country bordering the North Sea, succumbed to the exhaustive implications of the blockade, and eventually gravitated towards the Allied effort, causing elimination of Swedish exports of rubber and foodstuffs to Germany (Philpott 181). When Holland declined Britain’s appeal to enforce the blockade through Dutch ports (Philpott 208), the British cabinet contraband subcommittee took all steps to ensure Germany’s inability to send resources in neutral ships to or through Dutch ports (qtd. Philpott 225) by preventing Rotterdam from becoming a German supply base (qtd. Lambert 225). America’s entrance into the war in 1917 eliminated Germany’s cotton and the majority of copper, wheat, and fertilizers (Massie 534-35). Because of America’s industrial presence, it is evident that this furthered the gap in resources vital to attritional warfare between the two belligerent sides. The extermination of food, industrial, and military supplies to Germany diminished the health of soldiers and effectiveness of Germany’s military endeavours.

 The quantity of troops available throughout the war was a repercussion of the naval blockade that greatly contributed to German military failure. Internationally agreed upon, one term of the blockade was the restriction of military personnel and reservists from returning to Germany overseas (Farquharson-Roberts 173). One historian reveals, “…the blockade imposed by the Royal Navy limited the resources available to manufacture” (Paschall 129). Due to the limited imports that Germany now received, national industrialization was crucial. Thus, the Hindenburg programme was developed, an industrial campaign aiming to produce the numbers of war resources that German military both lacked and required. Historian Haswell-Lutz emphasizes the futile circulation of men between military and industry; while industry needed men to manufacture, the Army needed men to fight:

 The Army was calling for reinforcements, munitions, and war stores, while the employers demanded labour…enormous requirements in the form of war material…  could be met only by withholding considerable numbers of fit men from service at the front (67).

From the beginning of war until the Spring Offensive of 1918, Ludendorff’s divisions were reduced from 12 to 9 battalions, while battalion numbers decreased from 1,000 to 692 (Asprey 406). Field Marshal Hindenburg asserted that military operations were hampered due to a lack of sufficient troop replacements (Haswell-Lutz 29), suggesting the implications of potential reinforcements being confined by industrialization. Because military operations were the pivotal aspect that victory depended upon, the limitations on reinforcements induced by industrialization proved detrimental to the German cause.

 The blockade’s effect on food quantity negatively influenced the morale of remaining troops and minimal reinforcements that were provided to Germany throughout the First World War. The Reichstag raised hopes of fulfilled stomachs by exaggerating the success of U-Boat warfare and accordingly raising rations, only to leave these promises unfulfilled. This ultimately led to starvation of both civilians and soldiers, causing decreased military forces and retaining a depressing effect on both the homefront and front lines (Woodward 351). Civilians recruited to the military nearing the end of war believed that termination of war would be a far more appealing prospect than starvation, causing remaining troops to adopt these remonitions: “those that did arrive were so infused with socialist demands to end the war that they did far more harm than good” (Asprey 398). Evidently, it is seen that restricted food quantities imposed by the blockade were detrimental to the morale of German soldiers.

Extended supply lines in the final offensives proved disastrous to the German advance and were influenced by the effects of the blockade. The deficiency of fodder, fertilizers and other contributions to livestock foodstuffs (Massie 506-07) that was able to be imported to Germany restricted the advance in the offensive (Woodward 350) as malnourished horses were incapable of hauling the weight of munitions over the difficult terrain (Asprey 366). Asprey states: “Divisions stood miles ahead of their supply trains, whose wagons, pulled by skinny, underfed horses, lumbered with increasing difficulty over the pockmarked wasteland. Units were running short of ammunition and none was arriving” (Asprey 385).  In addition to deficient munitions due to the blockage of contraband, the logistics of getting ammunition to the attacking divisions proved unsuccessful. The effect of the economic blockade on German supply lines was decisive in the failure of the final offensives to gain the advantage.

By the end of war, the German troops’ perseverance to fulfill the offensive had vanished, ensuring an Allied victory. The appeal of abandoned British supplies that lay in the way of the German advance overpowered the will to persevere. Asprey states: “ the mundane appeal of a few more miles of territory scarcely matched the allure of… ‘quantities of tinned food and preserves of all description…clothing…plentiful supplies of alcohol’” (420). Although Field Marshal Hindenburg believed that these supplies were necessary to the attack due to lengthy supply lines (von Hindenburg 354), Asprey contends that entire German units surrendered themselves to looting and drinking, causing indifference to the predetermined task (Asprey 431). Hindenburg’s statement holds value given that the soldiers had discipline in rationing these supplies; however, they did not, and the benefits of the supplies were wasted. The Feldpolizei could not “drive drunken men from instant pleasure to dubious glory” (Asprey 420). The effects of starvation due to the blockade caused loss of German perseverance to become indispensable in the outcome of the offensive.

Naval strategy utilized by the British during World War One proved to be a detrimental factor in the failure of idolized German victory, and was destructive to German efforts in multiple ways. The naval blockade was inarguably significant in diminishing material, manpower, and morale, three vital aspects to achieving victory in an attritional war. German military operations ultimately failed because of the accumulating shortages that the Germans had faced for four ongoing years (qtd. Farquharson-Roberts 177). In the end, Germany’s military was  unable to successfully defeat the Allied forces due to the repercussions of the blockade.

Section C: Reflection

In conducting this investigation, I have developed better comprehension of the challenges facing historians. One challenge that historians face in analysis of an event is the inability to find sources concerning causes that do not directly affect an outcome, but do so through multiple events that accumulate towards the outcome. Historian Asprey comments on the challenges to finding sources vital to the construction of his analysis: “Neither those nor other… books appeared to tie the parts into a whole that explains Germany’s disastrous military defeat as a result of expanded military egos.”  (11) This allowed me to reflect upon how historians studying a correlation without previous accounts must construct analysis based on facts provided in each area of study without an accurate analysis of the two events linked, which proves to be tedious and challenging. Consequently, this affects the reliability of their own work.

Similarly, the nature of my investigation proved difficult in finding concrete evidence that provided a correlation between the British naval blockade and the outcome of the First World War. The correlation is not directly evident, because it regards the accumulation of events that the blockade triggered, leaving me to analyze the effects and link together the events to reach a reasonable conclusion. While selecting sources, I could find none that dealt solely with my question, which meant previous analysis was limited. Therefore, I had to determine values and limitations of each source’s content, and examine various sources to obtain content lacking in others. A lesson I have extrapolated from my investigation is the necessity to recognize the limitations and reliability of sources, and to search for these limited aspects in other sources to support assertions.

Works Cited

Asprey, Robert. The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct                                             

World War I. William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991. pp. 265 – 300, 363 – 433.

Farquharson-Roberts, Mike. A History of the Royal Navy: World War I. I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd,

2014. pp. 163 – 199.

Haswell Lutz, Ralph. The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918. The Board of Trustees of the

Leland Stanford Junior University, 1934. pp. 4-189.

Jellicoe, John. The Crisis of the Naval War. George H. Doran Company, 1920. pp. 182-222

Lambert, Nicholas. Planning Armageddon. Harvard University Press, 2012. pp. 205 – 278

Massie, Robert. Castles of Steel. Random House, 2003. pp. 503 – 528.

Paschall, Rod. The Defeat of Imperial Germany 1917-1918. Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill,

1989. pp. 128 – 162, 193-209.

Philpott, William. War of Attrition – Fighting the First World War. The Overlook Press, Peter

Mayer Publishers, Inc., 2014. pp. 169 – 208, 309 – 321.

Von Hindenburg, Paul. Out of My Life. Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1920. pp. 250 – 258, 306 – 314, 344 – 374, 400 – 423.

Woodward, Llewellyn. Great Britain and the War of 1914 – 1918. Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1967.

pp. 186 – 203, 335 – 352, 379-396.