Doing Gender Author(s): Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman Reviewed work(s): Source: Gender and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 125-151 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/189945 . Accessed: 03/01/2013 11:59

Doing Gender Author(s): Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman Reviewed work(s): Source: Gender and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 125-151 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/189945 . Accessed: 03/01/2013 11:59

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Gender and Society.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded on Thu, 3 Jan 2013 11:59:16 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage
http://www.jstor.org/stable/189945?origin=JSTOR-pdf
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
DOING GENDER

CANDACE WEST University of California, Santa Cruz

DON H. ZIMMERMAN University of California, Santa Barbara

The purpose of this article is to advance a new understanding of gender as a routine accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction. To do so entails a critical assessment of existing perspectives on sex and gender and the introduction of important distinctions among sex, sex category, and gender. We argue that recognition of the analytical independence of these concepts is essential for understanding the interactional work involved in being a gendered person in society. The thrust of our remarks is toward theoretical reconceptualization, but we consider fruitful directions

for empirical research that are indicated by our formulation.

In the beginning, there was sex and there was gender. Those of us who taught courses in the area in the late 1960s and early 1970s were careful to distinguish one from the other. Sex, we told students, was what was ascribed by biology: anatomy, hormones, and physiology. Gender, we said, was an achieved status: that which is constructed through psychological, cultural, and social means. To introduce the difference between the two, we drew on singular case studies of

hermaphrodites (Money 1968, 1974; Money and Ehrhardt 1972) and

anthropological investigations of “strange and exotic tribes” (Mead 1963, 1968).

Inevitably (and understandably), in the ensuing weeks of each term, our students became confused. Sex hardly seemed a “given” in

AUTHORS’ NOTE: This article is based in part on a paper presented at the Annual

Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, September 1977. For their

helpful suggestions and encouragement, we thank Lynda Ames, Bettina Aptheker, Steven Clayman, Judith Gerson, the late Erving Goffman, Marilyn Lester, Judith Lorber, Robin Lloyd, Wayne Mellinger, Beth E. Schneider, Barrie Thorne, Thomas P.

Wilson, and most especially, Sarah Fenstermaker Berk.

GENDER & SOCIETY, Vol. 1 No. 2, June 1987 125-151 0 1987 Sociologists for Women in Society

125

This content downloaded on Thu, 3 Jan 2013 11:59:16 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
126 GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1987

the context of research that illustrated the sometimes ambiguous and often conflicting criteria for its ascription. And gender seemed much less an “achievement” in the context of the anthropological, psycho- logical, and social imperatives we studied-the division of labor, the formation of gender identities, and the social subordination of women by men. Moreover, the received doctrine of gender socialization theories conveyed the strong message that while gender may be “achieved,” by about age five it was certainly fixed, unvarying, and static-much like sex.

Since about 1975, the confusion has intensified and spread far beyond our individual classrooms. For one thing, we learned that the relationship between biological and cultural processes was far more complex-and reflexive-than we previously had supposed (Rossi 1984, especially pp. 10-14). For another, we discovered that certain structural arrangements, for example, between work and family, actually produce or enable some capacities, such as to mother, that we formerly associated with biology (Chodorow 1978 versus Firestone 1970). In the midst of all this, the notion of gender as a recurring achievement somehow fell by the wayside.

Our purpose in this article is to propose an ethnomethodologically informed, and therefore distinctively sociological, understanding of gender as a routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment. We contend that the “doing” of gender is undertaken by women and men whose competence as members of society is hostage to its production. Doing gender involves a complex of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast particular pur- suits as expressions of masculine and feminine “natures.”

When we view gender as an accomplishment, an achieved property of situated conduct, our attention shifts from matters internal to the individual and focuses on interactional and, ultimately, institutional arenas. In one sense, of course, it is individuals who “do” gender. But it is a situated doing, carried out in the virtual or real presence of others who are presumed to be oriented to its production. Rather than as a property of individuals, we conceive of gender as an emergent feature of social situations: both as an outcome of and a rationale for various social arrangements and as a means of legitimating one of the most fundamental divisions of society.

To advance our argument, we undertake a critical examination of what sociologists have meant by gender, including its treatment as a role enactment in the conventional sense and as a “display” in Goffman’s (1976) terminology. Both gender role and gender display

This content downloaded on Thu, 3 Jan 2013 11:59:16 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
West, Zimmerman / DOING GENDER 127

focus on behavioral aspects of being a woman or a man (as opposed, for example, to biological differences between the two). However, we contend that the notion of gender as a role obscures the work that is involved in producing gender in everyday activities, while the notion of gender as a display relegates it to the periphery of interaction. We argue instead that participants in interaction organize their various and manifold activities to reflect or express gender, and they are disposed to perceive the behavior of others in a similar light.

To elaborate our proposal, we suggest at the outset that important but often overlooked distinctions be observed among sex, sex category, and gender. Sex is a determination made through the application of socially agreed upon biological criteria for classifying persons as females or males.’ The criteria for classification can be genitalia at birth or chromosomal typing before birth, and they do not necessarily agree with one another. Placement in a sex category is achieved through application of the sex criteria, but in everyday life, categorization is established and sustained by the socially required identificatory displays that proclaim one’s membership in one or the other category. In this sense, one’s sex category presumes one’s sex and stands as proxy for it in many situations, but sex and sex category can vary independently; that is, it is possible to claim membership in a sex category even when the sex criteria are lacking. Gender, in contrast, is the activity of managing situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s sex category. Gender activities emerge from and bolster claims to membership in a sex category.

We contend that recognition of the analytical independence of sex, sex category, and gender is essential for understanding the relation- ships among these elements and the interactional work involved in “being” a gendered person in society. While our primary aim is theoretical, there will be occasion to discuss fruitful directions for empirical research following from the formulation of gender that we propose.

We begin with an assessment of the received meaning of gender, particularly in relation to the roots of this notion in presumed biological differences between women and men.

PERSPECTIVES ON SEX AND GENDER

In Western societies, the accepted cultural perspective on gender views women and men as naturally and unequivocally defined

This content downloaded on Thu, 3 Jan 2013 11:59:16 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
128 GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1987

categories of being (Garfinkel 1967, pp. 116-18) with distinctive

psychological and behavioral propensities that can be predicted from their reproductive functions. Competent adult members of these soci- eties see differences between the two as fundamental and enduring- differences seemingly supported by the division of labor into women’s and men’s work and an often elaborate differentiation of feminine and masculine attitudes and behaviors that are prominent features of social organization. Things are the way they are by virtue of the fact that men are men and women are women-a division perceived to be natural and rooted in biology, producing in turn profound psycho- logical, behavioral, and social consequences. The structural arrange- ments of a society are presumed to be responsive to these differences.

Analyses of sex and gender in the social sciences, though less likely to accept uncritically the naive biological determinism of the view just presented, often retain a conception of sex-linked behaviors and traits as essential properties of individuals (for good reviews, see Hochschild 1973; Tresemer 1975; Thorne 1980; Henley 1985). The “sex differences approach” (Thore 1980) is more commonly attrib- uted to psychologists than to sociologists, but the survey researcher who determines the “gender” of respondents on the basis of the sound of their voices over the telephone is also making trait-oriented assumptions. Reducing gender to a fixed set of psychological traits or to a unitary “variable” precludes serious consideration of the ways it is used to structure distinct domains of social experience (Stacey and Thorne 1985, pp. 307-8).

Taking a different tack, role theory has attended to the social construction of gender categories, called “sex roles” or, more recently, “gender roles” and has analyzed how these are learned and enacted. Beginning with Linton (1936) and continuing through the works of Parsons (Parsons 1951; Parsons and Bales 1955) and Komarovsky (1946, 1950), role theory has emphasized the social and dynamic aspect of role construction and enactment (Thorne 1980; Connell 1983). But at the level of face-to-face interaction, the application of role theory to gender poses problems of its own (for good reviews and critiques, see Connell 1983, 1985; Kessler, Ashendon, Connell, and Dowsett 1985; Lopata and Thorne 1978; Thorne 1980; Stacey and Thorne 1985). Roles are situated identities-assumed and relin- quished as the situation demands-rather than master identities (Hughes 1945), such as sex category, that cut across situations. Unlike most roles, such as “nurse,” “doctor,” and “patient” or “professor” and “student,” gender has no specific site or organizational context.

This content downloaded on Thu, 3 Jan 2013 11:59:16 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
West, Zimmerman / DOING GENDER 129

Moreover, many roles are already gender marked, so that special qualifiers-such as “female doctor” or “male nurse”-must be added to exceptions to the rule. Thorne (1980) observes that conceptualizing gender as a role makes it difficult to assess its influence on other roles and reduces its explanatory usefulness in discussions of power and inequality. Drawing on Rubin (1975), Thorne calls for a reconceptu- alization of women and men as distinct social groups, constituted in “concrete, historically changing-and generally unequal-social relationships” (Thorne 1980, p. 11).

We argue that gender is not a set of traits, nor a variable, nor a role, but the product of social doings of some sort. What then is the social doing of gender? It is more than the continuous creation of the

meaning of gender through human actions (Gerson and Peiss 1985). We claim that gender itself is constituted through interaction.2 To

develop the implications of our claim, we turn to Goffman’s (1976) account of “gender display.” Our object here is to explore how gender might be exhibited or portrayed through interaction, and thus be seen as “natural,” while it is being produced as a socially organized achievement.

GENDER DISPLAY

Goffman contends that when human beings interact with others in their environment, they assume that each possesses an “essential nature”-a nature that can be discerned through the “natural signs given off or expressed by them” (1976, p. 75). Femininity and masculinity are regarded as “prototypes of essential expression- something that can be conveyed fleetingly in any social situation and yet something that strikes at the most basic characterization of the individual” (1976, p. 75). The means through which we provide such expressions are “perfunctory, conventionalized acts” (1976, p. 69), which convey to others our regard for them, indicate our alignment in an encounter, and tentatively establish the terms of contact for that social situation. But they are also regarded as expressive behavior, testimony to our “essential natures.”

Goffman (1976, pp. 69-70) sees displays as highly conventionalized behaviors structured as two-part exchanges of the statement-reply type, in which the presence or absence of symmetry can establish deference or dominance. These rituals are viewed as distinct from but articulated with more consequential activities, such as performing tasks or engaging in discourse. Hence, we have what he terms the

This content downloaded on Thu, 3 Jan 2013 11:59:16 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
130 GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1987

“scheduling” of displays at junctures in activities, such as the beginning or end, to avoid interfering with the activities themselves. Goffman (1976, p. 69) formulates gender display as follows:

If gender be defined as the culturally established correlates of sex (whether in consequence of biology or learning), then gender display refers to conventionalized portrayals of these correlates.

These gendered expressions might reveal clues to the underlying, fundamental dimensions of the female and male, but they are, in Goffman’s view, optional performances. Masculine courtesies may or may not be offered and, if offered, may or may not be declined (1976, p. 71). Moreover, human beings “themselves employ the term ‘expres- sion’, and conduct themselves to fit their own notions of expressivity” (1976, p. 75). Gender depictions are less a consequence of our “essential sexual natures” than interactional portrayals of what we would like to convey about sexual natures, using conventionalized gestures. Our human nature gives us the ability to learn to produce and recognize masculine and feminine gender displays-“a capacity [we] have by virtue of being persons, not males and females” (1976, p. 76).

Upon first inspection, it would appear that Goffman’s formulation offers an engaging sociological corrective to existing formulations of gender. In his view, gender is a socially scripted dramatization of the culture’s idealization of feminine and masculine natures, played for an audience that is well schooled in the presentational idiom. To continue the metaphor, there are scheduled performances presented in special locations, and like plays, they constitute introductions to or time out from more serious activities.

There are fundamental equivocations in this perspective. By segregating gender display from the serious business of interaction, Goffman obscures the effects of gender on a wide range of human activities. Gender is not merely something that happens in the nooks and crannies of interaction, fitted in here and there and not interfering with the serious business of life. While it is plausible to contend that gender displays-construed as conventionalized expres- sions-are optional, it does not seem plausible to say that we have the option of being seen by others as female or male.

It is necessary to move beyond the notion of gender display to consider what is involved in doing gender as an ongoing activity embedded in everyday interaction. Toward this end, we return to the distinctions among sex, sex category, and gender introduced earlier.

The post Doing Gender Author(s): Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman Reviewed work(s): Source: Gender and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 125-151 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/189945 . Accessed: 03/01/2013 11:59 appeared first on Versed Writers.

Welcome to originalessaywriters.com, our friendly and experienced essay writers are available 24/7 to complete all your assignments. We offer high-quality academic essays written from scratch to guarantee top grades to all students. All our papers are 100% plagiarism-free and come with a plagiarism report, upon request

Tell Us “Write My Essay for Me” and Relax! You will get an original essay well before your submission deadline.